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‘The origins, influence, suppression and resilience of the Maoist/Naxalite movement in India, 





On 25 May 1967, in one village called Prasadujot in the Naxalbari bloc in the West Bengal 
state of India, a group of peasants tried forcibly to seize land, to which the peasants had legal 
entitlement, from the landlords who controlled it.  They were led by two left-wing activists 
Kanu Sanyal (1929-2010) and Jangal Santhal (?-1981), and supported by a communist 
ideologue, Charu Mazumdar (1918-1972).i This resulted in a violent confrontation between 
the peasants and the police, who were supporting the landlords. This seemingly isolated 
revolt in a far flung village eventually gave birth to a movement that attracted the attention of 
the world. An English-language journalist or commentator gave it the name ‘Naxalite’, and 
this name has stuck and has even been adopted by the supporters of the movement. The word 
‘Naxalite’ is used in India both to describe the movement as well as to characterise an 
individual or an organisation associated with the movement e.g. ‘a Naxalite guerrilla’, ‘a 
Naxalite activist’ ‘a pro-Naxalite civil rights group’ or ‘a Naxalite sympathiser’. Almost 50 
years on from what seemed at first to be an isolated revolt, the fall out for Indian politics may 
be judged from a remark in 2010 by the then Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh. 
Singh, the main architect of the neo-liberal economic reforms initiated in India in July 1991 
when he was Finance Minister, characterised the Naxalite movement as the single biggest 
internal security threat to India, and urged that it needed to be controlled to keep India on its 
path of economic growth that he had initiated.ii 
 This paper looks at the background to the emergence of this movement; the 
significance of that May 1967 revolt, the immediate implications of that revolt for the left and 
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bourgeois politics in India, and very briefly the long term implications of the rise of the 
Naxalite movement. I was personally involved in this movement as a student activist and 
supporter, although I resisted the attempts by the ‘party’ leadership to involve me in acts of 
violence. However, although my activism amounted only to the study and dissemination of 
the ideas of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao Tse-tung as an undergraduate economics student at 
Panjab University, Chandigarh (India), I was arrested in 1971, tortured and narrowly escaped 
being killed.iii  
 The movement's first phase came to an end in 1972 but it has resurfaced in a different 
form quite powerfully in the last decade.iv Although most of the movement’s history relates 
to the years and decades after 1968, it has a close relationship with the events of 1968, as well 
as the overall political culture of India and the world around that time.  
 
Background: Parliamentary democracy, armed insurrection and Maoism in India’s 
Communist movement 1947-1967. 
The roots of the Naxalite movement lie in India’s communist movement. The Communist 
Party of India (CPI) was born shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution. After the degeneration 
of the Bolshevik Revolution and the rise of Stalinism in Russia, a very small current in the 
movement was sympathetic to the Left opposition led by Trotsky.v The bulk of the CPI went 
with Stalin not because of any specific admiration for Stalin or his policies but out of loyalty 
to the Soviet Union, considered then as the mother country of communism. Stalin’s influence 
on the CPI’s policies and strategy continued until his death in 1953.vi The Soviet Union’s role 
in defeating Nazi Germany ensured that Stalin was well regarded not only by CPI members 
and sympathisers but also more widely in India. This broader social approval in its turn 
reinforced the communist movement’s admiration for Stalin and the USSR. 
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 The CPI participated in the anti-colonial struggle against British rule in India but also 
directed its criticism at the ‘bourgeois’ leadership of the main Indian nationalist party- the 
Indian National Congress (INC) - led by Gandhi and Nehru. There were several other 
currents in Indian people’s struggle against British colonial rule which were influenced in 
varying degrees by the communist ideas. The most well-known was the group led by the 
Indian revolutionary Bhagat Singh, who played a leading role in organising terrorist attacks 
against the symbols of the colonial establishment in India.vii In contrast to the movement led 
by Gandhi, which adopted a path of non-violent resistance and struggle against colonial rule, 
Bhagat Singh epitomised the goal of violently overthrowing colonial rule.viii This competition 
between peaceful and armed struggle paths to India’s independence left a permanent legacy 
in India’s communist movement. Soon after India became independent in 1947, the CPI was 
riven with factional conflict between two tendencies - one advocating participation in the 
parliamentary democratic institutions set up under the constitution of the new republic, and 
the other advocating a path of armed insurrection. At the CPI’s second congress at Calcutta in 
February, 1948, the armed insurrection tendency won the ideological and organisation battle. 
The so-called ‘Zhdanov Doctrine’ of insurrection, named after CPSU ideologist Andrei 
Zhdanov, was accepted and rationalised on the premise that India was not really free, but 
only a ‘‘semi-colony of British imperialism’.’ix The conflict between the two tendencies 
became accentuated by the success of the Chinese revolution under Mao’s leadership. The 
faction deriving inspiration from the Chinese success and advocating the path of armed 
insurrection gained leadership temporarily and launched an armed uprising in the Telangana 
region of South India in 1946. [DATE?] This uprising was brutally crushed militarily by the 
Indian government led by Nehru, the first prime minister of India. The armed insurrection 
attempt having failed, the constitutionalist tendency gained the upper hand in the CPI 
leadership in 1951. [DATE?] As a result, the CPI started participating actively in central 
4 
 
parliamentary and state assembly elections after 1951. [DATE?] The CPI became the main 
opposition party in India’s central parliament and remained so for most of the 1950s. The 
greatest success of the CPI was to win a majority in the elections to the state assembly of the 
south Indian state of Kerala in 1957. This was the first time a democratically elected 
communist government had been formed in India,x ) and only the second time in the world - 
the tiny republic of San Marino in Italy had an elected communist administration from 1945 
and 1957.xi  
 The success of the democratic constitutional path did not end the struggle between the 
two tendencies in the CPI. The Sino-Soviet conflict from the late 1950s onwards sharpened 
this ideological contestation between the peaceful path supported by the Soviet Union and the 
armed struggle path supported by China.xii . The Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962 brought 
these two lines into sharp opposition.  The CPI formally supported the Indian national 
government of Nehru and accused China of launching an armed attack on India. This 
decision was opposed by a substantial, though not majority, section of the top party 
leadership, including some leading lights of India’s communist movement. This section 
expressed solidarity with China and criticised the Nehru government for military aggression 
against socialist China. This pro-China section characterised and denounced the political 
position of the pro-Indian nationalist leadership of the CPI as ‘revisionist’. The charge was 
that the main CPI leadership had abandoned the revolutionary path and had become 
collaborationist with the Indian state. The pro-China section of the CPI leadership was 
arrested and imprisoned by the Nehru government. The opposing tendencies in the party 
became so acutely polarised that the pro-China section eventually left the CPI in 1964 and 
formed the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI (M), written more generally as CPM).  
The formation of the CPM coincided with the start of the decline of the Indian National 
Congress that had dominated the anti-colonial struggle and had controlled power at the 
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federal centre and in the states in the post-colonial era. Nehru, who represented the 
dominance of the INC, died in 1964, and in the 1967 elections, the party was defeated in 
several states by anti-Congress united fronts of left, right and the centre. For the communist 
movement, it opened new opportunities of capturing and sharing power in certain states. The 
CPM, which had projected itself as a militant communist party keeping open the option of 
armed struggle, jumped at the opportunity of using constitutionally guaranteed power through 
elections, with the intention partly of ‘wrecking the constitution from within’ as a leading 
CPM leader and strategist E. M. S. Namboodiripad had once put it.xiii However, this strategy 
of using the parliamentary path disillusioned the more militant cadre who had left the CPI 
and had joined the CPM in the hope of launching militant class struggles and, if necessary, 
armed actions against the class enemies. The parliamentary and armed struggle paths came 
into sharp confrontation with each other on that fateful day in May 1967 when the peasants 
led by Kanu Sanyal and Jangal Santhal forcibly occupied the land and forced the landlords to 
flee. The West Bengal united front government, in which the CPM was a major partner, sent 
the state police to repress the rebellious peasants. The police firing led to the death of 11 
peasants, including 8 women and 2 children.xiv The Naxalite movement was born that day 
and the peasants killed that day became the martyrs of the movement. The CPM was further 
split. One section supported the ‘revolutionary peasants’, while the dominant section 
supported the party against the ‘left-wing adventurism’ of the Naxalbari activists. Beijing 
Radio and the People's Daily from China hailed the Naxalbari rebellion, calling it ‘a spring 
thunder in India’. The formation of the Communist Party of India (Marxist- Leninist) (CPI 
(ML)) was formally declared at an impressive rally in Calcutta on April 22, 1969 (Lenin’s 
birthday). The CPI (ML) declared its open allegiance to China and Mao Tse-tung thought and 
announced that its aim was the overthrow of the Indian state through an armed uprising of the 
Indian peasantry that would liberate the rural areas from class enemies. The liberated zones 
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would be used to create a red army that would eventually surround the cities and take them 
over, leading to the overthrow the Indian state. The CPI (ML) proclaimed itself to be the 
revolutionary party that would lead the revolutionary march of the red army from the rural to 
the urban areas. It denounced the CPM as ‘neo-revisionist’ implying that the CPM merely 
talked about revolution but in practice was following the same reformist parliamentary path it 
had denounced when it split from the ‘revisionist’ CPI. 
 
The significance of the 1967 revolt  
This raises several inter-connected and to an extent overlapping questions. What did this 
revolt represent in terms of the political culture of the time locally, nationally and globally? 
What were the key burning issues in India’s post-colonial history at that point of time that 
were highlighted by that revolt? What were the connections of that revolt with the 1968 
radical upsurge in countries of advanced capitalism? What was the relationship of that revolt 
to developments in the global communist movement? What challenges did the revolt pose for 
Marxist theory? This list of questions is not in any way exhaustive. This is merely a way of 
starting to make a sense of that revolt. 
 As far as the question of political culture of the time locally, nationally and globally is 
concerned, at the local level or state level in West Bengal, there was a tension between the 
growing militancy and strength of the communist movement in the state, and the restraint 
being imposed on that militancy by the fact that communist parties were part of the 
governance. At a national level, the Congress party was declining in importance in some 
regions of India while the party retained control at the federal-central level. At a global level, 
the contestation between the Chinese Communist Party and the CPSU for control of the 
global communist movement was being reflected at this local/regional and national level. 
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 One obvious issue in India’s post-colonial history at that time that was highlighted by 
that revolt seemed to be the decline of the Congress party and the emergence of the tensions 
in Centre-State relations as a result of that. Equally important was the unresolved agrarian 
question of land ownership and control. The dreams and hopes that had been raised when 
India became independent of direct colonial control, could no longer be sustained after about 
two decades of independence. The period of hope and optimism of the 1950s and perhaps 
early 1960s was giving way to a period of disenchantment, discontentment and revolt against 
the established order. This change in the national mood was beginning to be seen in the 
themes of Indian cinema too. 
 The revolt was certainly connected with the global radicalisation of politics around 
1968. This link was perhaps not obvious in the beginning, when the land question seemed to 
be the main concern of the movement, but the subsequent spread of the movement among the 
educated youth throughout the country signalled that connection very clearly, especially in 
cities like Kolkata (in West Bengal), Hyderabad (in Andhra Pradesh) and to a lesser extent 
Delhi and Chandigarh (where I was then a student).  
The revolt was most clearly linked with the schism in the world communist movement and 
the struggle between the CPC and CPSU for control and influence over that movement. This 
contestation took different forms in different places, but in India it expressed itself mainly in 
the split between supporters of the parliamentary path and the armed struggle path. 
Interestingly, this split was not along generational lines as might have been expected, with the 
younger members opting for armed struggle and the older ones opting for the parliamentary 
path. For example, the most prominent Naxalite leader in Punjab between 1967 and 
1971[WHEN?], Baba Bujha Singh, was in his 80s and he was not the only one in the mature 
age group.xv  Later on during the period between 1972 and 1975, [WHEN?] the influence of 
the movement was mainly among students and younger school teachers.  
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 The most challenging issue for Marxist theory raised by the revolt was the importance 
of peasantry in the struggle for overthrowing capitalism (or feudalism or semi-feudalism) in 
less developed capitalist economies in the Third World. The Monthly Review school of 
thought certainly theorised peasantry as a revolutionary class in line with the Maoist theory 
while New Left Review (just to take an example) criticised this sort of ‘Third Worldism’. 
Another important question was that of armed struggle and revolution versus parliamentary 
path and reforms. 
 
The immediate implications of the 1967 revolt for the left and bourgeois politics in India 
There were three armed communist rebellions in India right after independence in 1947. All 
three rebellions revolved around control over and ownership of land and produce from the 
land. One was in the Telangana region of the erstwhile southern state of Hyderabad which 
coincided with India’s independence from British colonial rule in 1947;
xviii
xvi the second one was 
in Tebhaga region in West Bengal in 1948,xvii and the third one was a Lal Communist Party 
(Red Communist Party) led revolt in the erstwhile PEPSU region of the present state of 
Punjab in 1948.  All three rebellions were militarily crushed by the Indian state, with large 
scale human rights violations in all three regions. Paradoxical as it may sound, the military 
suppression of these three armed rebellions spread the mass influence of the communist 
movement in these three states. This can be attributed primarily to two developments: first, 
the land reforms introduced by the Indian state to take the heat out of the communist 
movement, which ended up increasing the popularity of the communists, and second, the 
over-all global political culture which favoured communism in the 1950s. 
 The land reforms boosted communist influence because immediately after the Indian 
state had suppressed the armed rebellions in the three states, it initiated land reforms, mainly 
in the form of granting better propriety rights to the peasantry in order to deal with the 
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perceived socio-economic causes of the rebellions. In the mass consciousness of the 
peasantry, it was not the Indian state which was seen as their main benefactor - it was the 
communists, whose multiple sacrifices were seen as having forced the Indian state to grant 
concession to the peasants and tenants. In all three states - Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal and 
Punjab -  the electoral performance of the CPI was impressive in the 1950s. This suggests 
that the two distinct paths in communist politics - that of armed struggle and that of 
parliamentary work – could be complementary. This is something that has not been 
recognised either in the political perspectives of both the main tendencies- the armed struggle 
tendency and the parliamentary tendency- in the Indian communist movement, or in the 
academic literature on the subject. The failure to recognise this complementarity, and an 
over-emphasis on the competitiveness between the two tendencies have contributed to 
sectarianism in the Indian communist movement,xix with destructive implications for the 
communist movement both in India, and, perhaps, beyond.xx 
 On the contribution of global political culture in the 1950s to the growth in 
communist influence, it is important to note that in the post-Great Depression and post-
Second World period, there was general acceptance, both in the advanced capitalist 
economies and in the developing capitalist economies in the Third World, that the state and 
planning had positive roles to play in economic and political governance. The successful 
Soviet industrialisation of the 1930s  - despite its severe human costs - and the success of the 
Chinese revolution in 1949, together with the hegemony of Keynesian welfare policies in the 
countries of advanced capitalism, had increased the appeal of socialist and communist ways 
of organising societies. This overall global political culture contributed to communist 
influence in India and other developing capitalist economies. 
 In view of all this, we can interpret the emergence of the Naxalite movement in 1967 
as an off shoot of the continuing strengthening of communist influence in India in the 1960s. 
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This influence was not only expressed in the impressive electoral performances of the 
communist parties but extended beyond to the cultural sphere of literature, cinema and 
theatre; and to the social sphere in the form of trade unions, peasant organisations and student 
unions dominated by communists or sometimes non-communist socialists. The increasing 
communist influence in the country led, perhaps, to an overestimation of its potential, and the 
Naxalite movement was one outcome of this. In its turn, this over-optimism revived and 
strengthened the armed struggle heritage of the earlier period, and some participants of these 
earlier struggles became reenergised, and emerged as prominent participants in the new 
struggle (e.g. Baba Bujha Singh and Baba Hari Singh Mirgind in Punjab). However, although 
the Naxalite movement resembled the 1940s/50s struggles in terms of primacy it gave to 
armed struggle, there was also one critical difference. The three struggles of the 1940s and 
1950s were localised. They had no links with movements in other parts of India, even though 
these localised struggles were influenced by external ideological directions from the Soviet 
Union. The Naxalite movement, in contrast, started as a spontaneous local conflict but 
became very quickly an all-India phenomenon, spreading to Andhra Pradesh and Kerala in 
the South; Bihar and, to a lesser extent UP in the Hindi heartland; and Punjab, Himachal 
Pradesh and, to some extent, Delhi in the North.xxi   
 The Naxalite movement was also crushed in the same manner as the previous armed 
Communist rebellions, through very severe state repression. The scale of human rights 
violations was much higher and geographically more widespread than it had been during the 
earlier period - except perhaps in the southern state of Andhra Pradesh where in the 
1940s/1950s there were mass executions, especially of Muslim peasants that have remained 
under–reported.xxii . 
 The suppression of the Naxalite movement involved massive human rights violations. 
These included summary executions in police custody (called ‘encounter killings’), cases of 
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brutal torture leading to death, such as those of Charu Mazumdarxxiii and Baba Bujha 
Singh,xxiv and long periods of imprisonment. Such treatment gave birth to civil liberties and 
human rights organisations that were initially focussed on the release of political prisoners 
because thousands of Naxalite activists and sympathisers had been arrested and imprisoned. 
Some of the civil rights organisations involved in the campaign to demand release of political 
organisations were not politically sympathetic to Naxalites’ armed struggle methods but they 
viewed brutal suppression of the movement as a danger to the survival of democracy in India. 
This potential danger to democracy in India made them realise the necessity of strengthening 
the political culture of civil liberties and human rights xxv [SHOULD THIS POINT BE 
DEVELOPED A BIT HERE?] The experience of crushing the Naxalite movement led to 
greater militarisation of the Indian state, and the knowledge and practice the armed forces 
gained have since been used to crush other anti-Indian state nationalist rebellions in Kashmir, 
Punjab and the North East, as well as the reinvented Naxalite movement more recently, 
especially in the states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand in central India.xxvi  
 This increasing militarisation of the Indian state has occurred simultaneously with the 
incorporation of the mainstream constitutionalist communist parties into the political culture 
of Indian establishment. The CPI and CPM have become increasingly vocal supporters of 
Indian nationalism resembling the nationalism of the two major bourgeois parties in India- 
the Indian National Congress championing secular/semi-secular Indian nationalism and the 
Bharatiya Janata Party articulating the vision of Hindu nationalism. Undoubtedly, CPI and 
CPM are opposed to the virulent Hindu nationalist agenda of BJP which has been responsible 
for sharpening sectarian Hindu communal mobilisation against the minority Muslim 
community and to some extent against the even smaller Christian minority community. 
However, the constant reiteration by CPI and CPM of their commitment to the ‘unity and 
integrity of India’ which appears sometimes as an attempt to present these parties as not 
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being less patriotic than BJP or Congress, has pitted them against smaller nationalities 
struggles in India and feeds into the political culture of considering territorial integrity of 
India as non-negotiable. This political perspective puts CPI and CPM into an uneasy 
company with the Hindu nationalism of BJP which also harps on the territorial integrity of 
India as non-negotiable question  xxvii [IS THIS ENTIRELY FAIR – AREN’T THE CPI 
AND CPM OPPOSED TO HINDU NATIONALISM AS A DIVISIVE FORCE AGAINST 
INDIAN NATIONAL UNITY? STATEMENTS ON THEIR WEBSITES WOULD 
SUGGEST THEY ARE VERY CRITICAL OF THE BJP’S COMMUNALISM.] The 
constitutionalist communist parties’ constant invocation of their Indian patriotism has now 
made them accepted as respectable in the Indian state’s official culture.  
 The initial rise of the Naxalite movement from 1967, its suppression and subsequent 
re-emergence as CPI (Maoist) on 21 September, 2004 as a powerful armed movement has 
gone through various ups and downs.  The party’s network is spread over 160 odd districts in 
at least ten states of India, spanning some 400,000 square kilometres, equivalent to one-
eighths of the total Indian land mass.xxviii  
The long term implications of the rise of the Naxalite movement 
 Of the many long term political implications of the rise of Naxalite movement from 
the viewpoint of the left politics in India, two are particularly significant. The first is  the 
incorporation of the constitutionalist communist parties into India’s ruling establishment. It is 
possible that the constitutionalist communist parties might have been incorporated into 
India’s political establishment even if there was no Naxalite movement. However, the 
Naxalite’s rejection of India’s constitution and their support to smaller nationality struggles 
for independence/secession from India when contrasted with the constitutionalist communist 
parties’ repeated allegiance to India’s constitution and support for India’s territorial integrity 
against secessionist movements has made the constitutionalist communist parties appear 
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particularly respectable and acceptable in the official state culture.  [NO CAUSAL 
RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED HERE. THE EXPERIENCE OF 
COMMUNIST PARTIES EVERYWHERE ELSE IN THE WORLD WOULD SUGGEST 
THAT INCORPORATION INTO THE ESTABLISHMENT IS THEIR USUAL FATE, 
WHETHER OR NOT THERE ARE ARMED INSURGENCIES. THE ROLE OF 
NAXALISM IN THIS PROCESS NEEDS TO BE SHOWN, NOT MERELY ASSERTED.]  
The second important political implication is the emergence of a sustainable communist 
tendency in India wedded to the path of armed struggle. This armed struggle communist 
tendency has not only survived various downturns in the communist movement in India, it is, 
in fact, seems to be competing with the constitutional communist tendency as politically more 
significant force. There is now little evidence of the complementarity between the 
constitutionalist path and the revolutionary armed struggle path discussed earlier. The 
relationship between them seems to be almost exclusively competitive.xxix This led to violent 
conflicts between the Naxalites and the activists of the CPM in West Bengal in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. This bloody saga of tit-for-tat killings of the cadres of the two tendencies 
was one of the most shameful periods of sectarianism in India’s communist movement. 
 A long term consequence of the emergence of the Naxalite movement of the 1960s is 
that there is now a limited degree of co-existence between this communist tendency 
(currently called the Communist Party of India (Maoists)) and the Indian state. This 
coexistence has assumed a specific character - the movement led by the CPI (Maoists) is 
contained within the most underdeveloped regions of India that are resource rich. The Indian 
state has de facto accepted that several districts in central India constitute a Naxalite area of 
influence. Nandini Sundar, a Delhi-based left-wing sociologist who has done extensive field 
work in the central Indian regions where the current Maoist movement is concentrated, points 
out that the Indian security forces engaged in combing operations against the Maoists control 
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the roads leading to the areas of Maoist influence while ‘‘The Maoists control the jungles. In 
the frontlines of this battle are ordinary villagers who are being pitted against each other on a 
scale unparalleled in the history of Indian counterinsurgency’.’xxx    The CPI (Maoist) 
movement cannot expand beyond these contained areas, while the Indian state is not able to 
crush the movement in these areas without incurring significant security force losses and 
massive human rights violations.  
 This coexistence is, of course, temporary and riddled with tensions and 
perpetual conflict. At some stage the Indian capitalist class supported by 
international corporations may pressurise the state to launch a sustained armed 
attack on the CPI (Maoists) to wrest back the control of these regions of central 
India.  International and national capital would certainly prefer to have unhindered 
access to these regions to get at their natural resources. Gautam Navlakha  captures 
very succinctly the attraction of this resource rich region for Indian and global 
capital where he points out that when the central government speaks of Maoists 
obstructing development in tribal areas, it means the resistance Maoists are putting 
up against   corporate exploitation of minerals, forests, water and land resources of 
adivasis [tribals]. He further points out that the capital intensive methods of 
production employed by corporations need  skilled labour imported from outside 
and mere marginal employment of locals as unskilled low wage labour. In order to 
bypass laws requiring local consent, the documents are doctored or forged. Citing 
a study by India’s  Planning Commission, Navlakha highlights  that between 1951 
and 1990, 40 million people were '‘moved out'‘ or displaced in rural and urban 
India and  of these 40 per cent were tribals.’.xxxi [NAVLAKHA MAY HAVE 
BEEN SUCCINCT, BUT THIS PASSAGE IS NOT. CAN WE CUT IT DOWN 
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SO THAT THE ESSENTIAL POINTS ARE MADE IN CONSIDERABLY 
FEWER WORDS?] 
 
The Indian state may well succumb to the pressure of global and Indian capital to push for 
unhindered access to these regions' natural resources. If it is able to muster sufficient national 
consensus to launch armed intrusions into these regions to break the Maoist resistance it will 
lead to human rights violations on an unprecedented scale. It will also  further strengthen the 
militarisation of the Indian state. Such a scenario may be considered unthinkable now but 
history tells us that unthinkables do happen. 
 In one respect, the CPI (Maoist) perspective and strategy differs not only from the 
constitutionalist communist parties but also all other all-India parties. The CPI (Maoist) does 
not subscribe to the idea that India is one nation. It recognises the multiple nationalities in 
India and the right of these nations to self-determination.xxxii
xxxiii xxxiv
 If the political economy of 
India’s capitalist development leads to sharper conflicts between multiple regional nationalist 
aspirations and the Centre representing one unified Indian nationalism, whether in secular or 
Hindu garb, alliances may emerge between communist revolutionaries and regional 
nationalist formations against the Centre. The Centre may not be able to crush these 
alliances.  If the constitutionalist communist parties (mainly the CPI and CPM)   cease 
siding ideologically with the parties of centralised and unitarist Indian nationalism and come 
to recognise the progressive potentialities of regional nationalisms in India, this could greatly 
enhance the power of the communist-regional nationalism alliance known in Indian political 
discourse as Third Alternative or Third Front.xxxv That historical possibility for re-imagining 





The Naxalite movement emerged from the conflict between two tendencies in the 
global and Indian communist movement - the parliamentary constitutionalist path 
and the armed struggle path. Its timing and political approach was also shaped by 
global political movements such as the 1968 radical upsurge. In its first phase, 
[1967-69] its support base was mainly among the peasants and tribal 
communities, and in the second phase, [1969-72DATES NEEDED HERE] its 
main support base shifted to urban students and youth. During this second phase, 
it represented some of the radicalism and the iconoclasms of the wider global 
student and youth movement of 1968. After suffering a decline from mid1970s to 
late 1970s, [THROUGHOUT THAT DECADE, OR FROM A CERTAIN 
POINT?] over the past three decades the Naxalite movement has re-emerged, 
especially since 2004, as a powerful challenger to the hegemony of the centralist 
Indian state. The revived movement has taken a leading role in developing social 
welfare, human developmental and educational activities in the tribal areas where 
it has operated for decades and where it has de facto administrative control. 
Additionally, the social base, and even the leadership profile, of the movement 
has significantly changed from urban middle class students and intelligentsia to 
tribal young men and, even more significantly, to tribal women. Again, Navlakha 
has described this social welfare and educational work very well: ‘For nearly 
three decades, Maoists have lived, mobilised, radicalised and empowered the 
tribals to set up their own ‘‘governance’’. What began in the early 1980s as a 
campaign against forest, revenue and police departments and money- lenders 
started to address ‘internal contradictions’ in adivasi society, including land 
ownership... And the Maoists took up issues of fixing prices for forest produce, 
the most important being raising of prices of ‘tendu patta’ from Rs 2 for 100 
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bundles (of 100 leaves each) in the early 1980s to Rs 80 for the same by mid- 
1990s. The ‘janata sarkar’ [Parallel Peoples’ Government] runs schools, health 
system, rural credit and seed bank, small irrigation projects, etc…They have also 
introduced social reforms, pushed gender sensitive reforms within the adivasi 
society including inside families... In north Bihar,  ... Maoists are helping people 
to tide over acute water scarcity in Gaya district of central Bihar. After three 
consecutive years of scarce rainfall, water shortage was expected. While the 
administration slept, the cadres are digging wells, paying for repairs of hand 
pumps, installing new ones, getting well-to-do farmers to use diesel pumps to 
create water reservoir for village use, as well as ensuring equitable distribution of 
water... Thus, the Maoists pose a challenge unlike anything posed by other 
insurgencies. xxxvi‘ ’ [AGAIN, THIS PASSAGE COULD USEFULLY BE 
SHORTENED] 
 
Regarding the shift in the social base and leadership profile of the movement to 
the tribal men and women, the best testimony comes from a participant in the 
movement. Bachcha Prasad Singh, an activist of the movement, who was released 
from Punjab’s Patiala Central Jail on 31 May 2016, provided an insider view of 
this aspect of the movement in an interview he gave to Shailza Sharma: There 
was a time when majority of the leadership was among the students and 
intellectuals from middle class and in fact the current leadership is a continuity of 
the intelligentsia who joined at that time... but presently, a large majority from the 
peasantry and Adivasis are forming a part of the on-ground leading forces. The 
revolutionary movement is trying to cultivate a leadership amongst the 
Adivasis… . Earlier there was a tradition of intellectuals joining the revolutionary 
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movement from Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Punjab and other States; however, 
this has seen a slowdown since the revolutionary movement is weak in urban and 
plain areas. . It is a positive aspect of the movement that the leading forces are 
Adivasis, however, if the movement has to be advanced, the leadership has to 
come from students and intellectuals.xxxvii [CONDENSE, PLEASE] 
Though this view reflects the outdated Leninist view of the party where intellectuals bring the 
‘scientific consciousness’ of socialism to the working masses, he shows the growing Adivasi 
character of leadership that is reflective of the mass base of the party. 
The long term legacy of the 1960s Naxalite movement in India is fourfold: one, it has 
given birth to a sustainable communist tendency following the extra parliamentary path of 
armed struggle; two, it has given birth to a human rights/democratic rights/civil liberties 
movement in India; third, it has produced at least two generations of academics and 
journalists inspired by the movement in the direction of Marxism, and fourth, its impact has 
been seen in quite significant ways in varieties of creative literary and artistic productions. 
We have already discussed the first two and would briefly indicate the evidence for the third 
and the fourth. Some of the leading Indian social scientists whether working in India or 
abroad demonstrate the impact of the Naxalite movement in their work as Marxism-inspired 
scholars. Just to mention a few: the economists Amit Bhaduri and Paresh Chattopadhyay, the 
political scientists Randhir Singhxxxviii and Manoranjan Mohanty, the sociologist Nalini 
Sundar and historian Ranjit Guha. In the field of journalism, the best known Indian social 
scientist journal Economic and Political Weekly has often contributions from journalists 
whose work clearly shows the influence of the Naxalite movement such as Sumanta Banerjee 
and Gautam Navlakha. The late Samar Sen who edited the weekly Frontier for many years 
was a hugely respected journalist.  
19 
 
Regarding the impact of the movement on literary and artistic productions, it is most 
well known in Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Bengal and Kerala. In Punjab, the poets Pash, Sant 
Ram Udasi and Lal Singh Dilxxxix, and the theatre artist Gursharan Singh clearly articulate the 
impact of the movement. In Andhra Pradesh, Naxalite folk songs have become part of the 
mainstream and Gummadi Vittal Rao, popularly known as Gaddar (born 1949), is a 
celebrated Telgu poet who openly supports the Naxalite movement. In Bengal, Satyajit 
Ray's 1971 film Seemabaddha was based on the life of an upper class family during the 
Naxalite Movement, Khwaja Ahmad Abbas made a critically acclaimed film The Naxalites in 
1980, and a 2005 movie called Hazaaron Khwaishein Aisi, directed by Sudhir Mishra, was 
set against the backdrop of the Naxalite movement. From Kerala, Satchidanandan is a 
nationally and internationally recognised poet who was inspired by the Naxalite movement. 
[SOME EXAMPLES OF THIS WOULD BE VERY WELCOME, ESPECIALLY THE 
LAST 2.] 
Politically, the single most important threat to the left and democratic movement 
in India is the rise of Hindu nationalists to power at the central/federal 
government and in some states, given the clear fascist/semi-fascist tendencies in 
Hindu nationalism. The leadership of the Naxalite movement seems aware of the 
challenges this poses for the left and democratic movements in India. As Bachcha 
Prasad Singh put it in the interview cited above: ‘In my opinion the way to 
confront the present scenario is to form a strong resistance and a broader united 
front against Hindutva forces, it does not matter if this united front is a collection 
of the parliamentary left, radical left or socialist faction, a united front is required. 
A unanimous and public backlash against imperialism, Hindu fundamentalism 
and State repression from a cultural, economic or political front, is the need of the 
hour; on individual and local levels, without emphasising the need for any sort of 
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organizational backing, we have to create strong counteractive forces. It is the 
time to stay united, to forget our dogmatic and ideological differences and 
remember what Lenin said ‘divided we fall, united we win’.’xl 
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